Pre -Revolutionary War   

William Chase (1621/22 England - 1684/85 Yarmouth, MA) – my 10th great grandfather
BET. 24 AUG – 2 SEP 1645 Was drummer receiving extra 5s his service   

William Jarvis (1727 Fly Creek, NY – 1772) – my 6th great grandfather  
Served as officer in French war. 

Revolutionary War  

 John Holdridge (1746 Hebron, CT – 1834, Wayne, NY) – my 5th great grandfather
(all Loudon, Albany Co., NY ):
Bef. 1777 - Private, Capt. Cook’s Co.
Bet. 01 Jan 1777–31 Dec 1779 -Sergeant, Capt. Abraham Watson’s Co., Col. John Greaton’s (2d) Regt.
Bet. 01 Jan 1780–28 Feb 1782 - Ensign, Capt. James Tisdale’s (5th) Co., Col. John Greaton’s (3d MA) Regt.
Bet. 01 Mar–30 Jun 1782 – Ensign, Capt. Abraham Watson’s (3d) Co., Col. John Greaton’s (3d MA) Regt.
Bet. 01–31 Jul 1782 – Ensign, Capt. Simon Kackson’s (8th), Co., Col. John Greaton’s (3d MA) Regt.
Bet. Aug–Sep 1782 – Lieutenant, Capt. Simon Jackson’s (8th) Co., Col. John Greaton’s (3d MA) Regt.   

Joshua P Stepp

Civil War

Joshua P. Stepp (1824 Buncombe Co., NC to 1862) – my 4th great grandfather
Civil War Soldier – South.   Pictured here. 

 Marcus Maloney Jones (1846 Buncombe Co., NC – 1923) – my 3rd great grandfather
Regiment Name 29 North Carolina Infantry Company B Private in and out 
A snapshot of three veterans of the Civil War when they attended a reunion at , including Marcus in the middle, is pictured here. 

Marcus Jones

Mitchell A. Jenkins (1832, NC – 1862, NC) – my 3rd great grandfather
Enlisted in Company F, North Carolina 29th Infantry Regiment on 31 Aug 1861. 
Mustered out on 12 May 1862 at Cumberland Gap, TN

NEW YORK: Link here for an article on the new New York opinion on the topic.  The New York opinion is here.   My opinion of the New York opinion?  They “punted.”  Here’s an excerpt of what they said:

         The judge also should be mindful of the appearance created when he/she establishes a connection with an attorney or anyone else appearing in the judge’s court through a social network. In some ways, this is no different from adding the person’s contact information into the judge’s Rolodex or address book or speaking to them in a public setting. But, the public nature of such a link (i.e., other users can normally see the judge’s friends or connections) and the increased access that the person would have to any personal information the judge chooses to post on his/her own profile page establish, at least, the appearance of a stronger bond. A judge must, therefore, consider whether any such online connections, alone or in combination with other facts, rise to the level of a “close social relationship” requiring disclosure and/or recusal (Compare Opinion 07-141 with Opinion 06-149).

KENTUCKY: The Kentucy opinion is here.   My opinion of the Kentucky opinion?  I think they got it right.  Hooray!  Here’s an excerpt of what they said:

While the nomenclature of a social networking site may designate certain participants as “friends,” the view of the Committee is that such a listing, by itself, does not reasonably convey to others an impression that such persons are in a special position to influence the judge. *** While social networking sites may create a more public means of indicating a connection, the Committee’s view is that the designation of a “friend” on a social networking site does not, in and of itself, indicate the degree or intensity of a judge’s relationship with the person who is the “friend”. The Committee conceives such terms as “friend,” “fan” and “follower” to be terms of art used by the site, not the ordinary sense of those words. Recent judicial ethics opinions in other states have reached conflicting results.  See  Fla. Jud. Ethics Advisory Opinion 2009-20(concluding that judges may not add lawyers who may appear before the judge as “friends” on a social networking site); contra N.Y. Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 08-176(concluding that judges may belong to internet-based social network, but should exercise discretion and otherwise comply with Rules Governing Judicial Conduct); S.c. Advisory Committee Opinion 17-2009(concluding that ajudge may be a member of Facebook and be “friends” with law enforcement officers, so long as they do not discuss matters relating to the judge’s position). The Florida committee found it significant that in order for a judge to list someone as a “friend,” or for another person to list the judge as a “friend,” the judge was required to consent to the listing.

Apparently, the legal profession has been talking about whether judges can ethically be friends of others on Facebook .   I think this is silly.  IMHO, of course they can.  They just can’t tweet and put on their status updates things about their job like, “Had a litigant make a stupid argument today. What a loser.”  

Apparently, someone was actually concerned enough to take this to the South Carolina Department of Justice which issued the following opinion (link here):

“A judge may be a member of Facebook and be friends with law enforcement officers and employees of the Magistrate as long as they do not discuss anything related to the judge’s position as magistrate.”

The SC opinion just talks about law enforcement officers and employees of the Judge – not lawyers appearing before the judge.  Although you could argue there is a distinction (namely that attorneys are representing a party where as the law enforcement officers are on the side of administering justice), that line blurrs when you consider that law enforcement officers could include prosecutors and could be witnesses for the state.

 I don’t see how the issue of judges being friends is any different from any lawyer being a friend on Facebook or any employee for that matter.  Lawyers cannot reveal confidences and employees cannot divulge trade secrets or confidential information (including pricing and strategies) of their employer.  That’s right, even regular old employees cannot put on Facebook something like  “we are not bidding on this project” or “we got intel today that made us all jump up and down because they will announce XYZ tomorrow” or ”we are bidding xyz for 8 mil and going to blow them away” or well, you get the picture.  Just don’t say that kinda stuff and you are cool, right?

Common sense.  Well, there’s more.  The Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee of the Florida Supreme Court was asked to answer these two questions (among others) (link here):

Whether a judge may post comments and other material on the judge’s page on a social networking site, if the publication of such material does not otherwise violate the Code of Judicial Conduct.

ANSWER: Yes.

Whether a judge may add lawyers who may appear before the judge as “friends” on a social networking site, and permit such lawyers to add the judge as their “friend.”

ANSWER: No.

 Huh?  I get the first one, but the second?  Respectfully, I disagree with their reasoning.  They explain (underline is mine):

The inquiring judge proposes to identify lawyers who may appear in front of the judge as “friends” on the judge’s page and to permit those lawyers to identify the judge as a “friend” on their pages.  To the extent that such identification is available for any other person to view, the Committee concludes that this practice would violate Canon 2B.

Canon 2B states:  “A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.”    

***

The Committee believes that listing lawyers who may appear before the judge as “friends” on a judge’s social networking page reasonably conveys to others the impression that these lawyer “friends” are in a special position to influence the judge.  This is not to say, of course, that simply because a lawyer is listed as a “friend” on a social networking site or because a lawyer is a friend of the judge, as the term friend is used in its traditional sense, means that this lawyer is, in fact, in a special position to influence the judge.  The issue, however, is not whether the lawyer actually is in a position to influence the judge, but instead whether the proposed conduct, the identification of the lawyer as a “friend” on the social networking site, conveys the impression that the lawyer is in a position to influence the judge.  The Committee concludes that such identification in a public forum of a lawyer who may appear before the judge does convey this impression and therefore is not permitted.

Does anyone really think that if a lawyer is a Facebook “friend” of a judge that that alone is enough to suggest an impression that that person could influence the Judge? 

Perhaps people use Facebook differently.   Think about it this way.  Facebook has supplanted the use by most people of their own web site.  Back in the day, computer geeks all had their own bulletin board.  Then in the 90s, everyone had their own homepage (I had one on Geocities).  Now, we have Facebook pages. 

So let’s apply Florida’s reasoning to homepages.  Could a judge have his or her own homepage open to the public with cute pictures of their cats and runs and awards and speeches?  Sure they could (subject to the same ideas above that they cannot say certain things about litigants, etc.).  So why is Facebook different?  Because of the word “Friend”  that is applied to those who have to affirmatively be granted access?  And because the very consideration of a request to access by the judge and the granting of that request is could lead to an impression of a preference over others?  I mean, theoretically, a judge could make his or her profile completely available and open to everyone on Facebook — but they would still have “Friends”.   In an open Facebook page, keeping “Friends” is not about access, but about “listening” to certain “Friends” status updates in the news feed and keeping an address book.   This is no different than basically publishing which personal websites a judge visited to keep tabs on people in the “old days.” 

I guess this is a long way of me saying that being “Friends” on Facebook does not mean you are “Friends” but that you have logged certain acquaintances in your address book and listen to the same stuff they’d have posted on their websites.  I don’t imply any true “friendship” to it.  

On the flip side, I can see that one of the purposes of social networking is to create an “in” crowd.   But here’s my point: How is that any different than real life?  Lawyers go and talk to judges all the time at dinners and events.  What if all those were actually logged.  To me, the logging is the only difference.

BTW – I guess in Florida you can’t have a “Connection” with a judge on LinkedIn? 

Whereas, on or about the night prior to Christmas, there did occur at a certain improved piece of real property (hereinafter “the House”) a general lack of stirring by all creatures therein, including, but not limited to a mouse.

A variety of foot apparel, e.g., stocking, socks, etc., had been affixed by and around the chimney in said House in the hope and/or belief that St. Nick a/k/a/ St. Nicholas a/k/a/ Santa Claus (hereinafter “Claus”) would arrive at sometime thereafter. The minor residents, i.e. the children, of the aforementioned House were located in their individual beds and were engaged in nocturnal hallucinations, i.e. dreams, wherein vision of confectionery treats, including, but not limited to, candies, nuts and/or sugar plums, did dance, cavort and otherwise appear in said dreams.

Whereupon the party of the first part (sometimes hereinafter referred to as (“I”), being the joint-owner in fee simple of the House with the party of the second part (hereinafter “Mamma”), and said Mamma had retired for a sustained period of sleep. (At such time, the parties were clad in various forms of headgear, e.g., kerchief and cap.

Suddenly, and without prior notice or warning, there did occur upon the unimproved real property adjacent and appurtenant to said House, i.e., the lawn, a certain disruption of unknown nature, cause and/or circumstance. The party of the first part did immediately rush to a window in the House to investigate the cause of such disturbance.

At that time, the party of the first part did observe, with some degree of wonder and/or disbelief, a miniature sleigh (hereinafter “the Vehicle”) being pulled and/or drawn very rapidly through the air by approximately eight (8) reindeer. The driver of the Vehicle appeared to be and in fact was, the previously referenced Claus.

Said Claus was providing specific direction, instruction and guidance to the approximately eight (8) reindeer and specifically identified the animal co-conspirators by name: Dasher, Dancer, Prancer, Vixen, Comet, Cupid, Donner and Blitzen (hereinafter “the Deer”). (Upon information and belief, it is further asserted that an additional co- conspirator named “Rudolph” may have been involved.)

The party of the first part witnessed Claus, the Vehicle and the Deer intentionally and willfully trespass upon the roofs of several residences located adjacent to and in the vicinity of the House, and noted that the Vehicle was heavily laden with packages, toys and other items of unknown origin or nature. Suddenly, without prior invitation or permission, either express or implied, the Vehicle arrived at the House, and Claus entered said House via the chimney.

Said Claus was clad in a red fur suit, which was partially covered with residue from the chimney, and he carried a large sack containing a portion of the aforementioned packages, toys, and other unknown items. He was smoking what appeared to be tobacco in a small pipe in blatant violation of local ordinances and health regulations.

Claus did not speak, but immediately began to fill the stocking of the minor children, which hung adjacent to the chimney, with toys and other small gifts. (Said items did not, however, constitute “gifts” to said minor pursuant to the applicable provisions of the U.S. Tax Code.)

Upon completion of such task, Claus touched the side of his nose and flew, rose and/or ascended up the chimney of the House to the roof where the Vehicle and Deer waited and/or served as “lookouts.” Claus immediately departed for an unknown destination.

However, prior to the departure of the Vehicle, Deer and Claus from said House, the party of the first part did hear Claus state and/or exclaim: “Merry Christmas to all and to all a good night!” Or words to that effect.

Just to give my blog readers a “little more” on the subject, here’s the rest of a paragraph that was not published due to space constraints.

Bloggers who have not complied with the principle are now playing catch-up.  They may even be erring on the side of over disclosing.  The rule is not as broad as it seems.  For example, in Example 8 to Section 255.0, in the Guide, the FTC notes that it is not considered an endorsement if a consumer that (1) buys dog food and decides to review the food on a blog or (2) is given a free trial bag of dog food by the store.  However, it would be considered an endorsement, subject to the disclaimer rules, if the consumer obtains the food through a marketing program aimed to distribute the food to potential reviewers.  Thus, it is the more direct advertiser-blogger relationship that is the focus because it gives rise to the potential conflict of interest. 

For more information on the subject The Guide can be found here.  For more information about the FTC historically going after the advertiser that prompted a review without proper disclosure, see here.